

Improving Outcomes Through Applying Safety Science

America Outdoors Annual Conference, Nov 29-Dec 2, 2022 : Part I of II

Jeff Baierlein, Director, Viristar

viristar.com

viristar.com/ao-safety-science



Outline of Session



Introductions



Presentation: application
to outdoor programs



Presentation:
safety science



Self-assessment



Discussion



Closure

Outcomes

You will:



Understand risk management theories and models used across industries



Identify which models are most widely accepted as current best practice



Identify which model or models may be most useful for your context





Understand the extent to which your current risk management structure reflects best practice



Understand where to go to learn more about risk management for outdoor programs


Principal Concepts



Many models of how to manage risk exist

It's important to use current models

Current models employ complex socio-technical systems theory



The Risk Domains Model is one current model







The Risk Domains model can be applied to outdoor programs via resilience engineering & other techniques

Basic Concepts

Risk: the possibility of undesirable loss.

Risk Management: the process of maintaining risk at a socially acceptable level.

Four ways to manage risk:

	Eliminate	Avoid certain activities, locations, conditions	No running Class VI rapids
	Reduce	Institute sound safety practices	Helmets & PFDs required
	Transfer	Pass risk to insurers, contractors, participants	Liability waivers
	Accept	Acknowledge some risk as unavoidable	Inherent risk

Safety Science

The field of risk management includes:

- Career specialists
- Theories, models
- Academic journals
- PhD programs in risk management
- Best practices that apply across industries



Risk Management Models

The importance of using appropriate models:

- Your risk management system is based on theoretical models.
- Some models are now considered obsolete.
- You have a duty to use the current best thinking in risk management
- You may be held to that standard if an incident occurs.



Evolution in Safety Thinking



Evolution in Safety Thinking

Principle of
causation

Single causes
(‘Root’)

Multiple causes
(‘Latent’)

Complex outcomes
(‘Emergent’)

OUTDATED

OUTDATED

CURRENT

(non-linear)

Epidemiological model (complex linear)

Sequential model (simple linear)

1920

1940

1960



1980

2000

Linear Models


Domino model

Herbert Heinrich, *Industrial Accident Prevention*, 1931.



Linear Models


Fault tree analysis,
Fishbone diagram



Epidemiological Model

*The “Swiss Cheese” error model,
James Reason, 1990*

- Events + latent conditions
- Like an exposure + a pathogen reservoir
- Complex linear model
- First systems model



Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. 327, 475–484 (1990)

475

Printed in Great Britain

The contribution of latent human failures to the breakdown of complex systems

BY J. REASON

Department of Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, U.K.

Several recent accidents in complex high-risk technologies had their primary origins in a variety of delayed-action human failures committed long before an emergency state could be recognized. These disasters were due to the adverse conjunction of a

Complex Systems Model

Characteristics of complex systems:

- Difficulty in achieving widely shared recognition that a problem even exists, and agreeing on a shared definition of the problem
- Difficulty identifying all the specific factors that influence the problem
- Limited or no influence or control over some causal elements of the problem
- Uncertainty about the impacts of specific interventions
- Incomplete information about the causes of the problem and the effectiveness of potential solutions
- A constantly shifting landscape where the nature of the problem itself and potential solutions are always changing

Examples of complex systems:



Global climate crisis



Inequity & exclusion




Outdoor recreation

Complex Socio-technical Systems



Complex Socio-technical Systems



Government

Passes laws

Regulators, Associations

Create regulations

Company

Sets policies

Management

Makes operating plans

Staff

Performs work actions

Work

May involve hazardous processes

AcciMap adapted from: Risk Management In a Dynamic Society: A Modelling Problem.
Jens Rasmussen, Safety Science 27/2-3 (1997)

Complex Socio-technical Systems

1. Govnm. policy
& budgeting


2. Regulatory
bodies and
associations

3. Local area govm.
planing & budgeting



4. Company
planning

5. Physical
processes
and actor
activities


6. Equipment &
surroundings




Complex Socio-technical Systems



Risk Domains Model



Risk Domains Model



Manage risks in risk domains with policies, procedures, values and systems

Risk Management Instruments



Risk Transfer



Incident Management



Incident Reporting



Incident Reviews



Risk Management Committee



Medical Screening



Risk Management Reviews



Media Relations



Documentation



Accreditation



Seeing Systems

Sidebar: Risk Assessments

Limitations of Risk Assessments

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) approach:

Risk	Probability	Magnitude	Treatment

		Magnitude		
		Slight	Moderate	Severe
	Unlikely			
	Possible			
	Likely			

Limitations of Risk Assessments

- Typically assesses only direct, immediate risks from specific activities, locations or populations, such as
 - weather
 - traffic hazards
 - equipment failure
- Typically **fails to account for underlying risk factors** such as:
 - poor safety culture
 - financial pressures
 - deficits in training & documentation
 - lack of regulatory oversight
- Typically **fails to account for human factors in error causation**, e.g.
 - cognitive biases
 - cognitive shortcuts (heuristics)
- **Fails to consider systems effects**: how multiple risks interact in complex and unpredictable ways that to lead to incidents
- **Ineffective as a comprehensive risk management tool** or stand-alone indicator of good risk management



The image shows a risk assessment matrix on a clipboard. The matrix is titled "Risk Assessment" in red. It has a grid of colored cells (red, orange, yellow, green) representing different risk levels. A black pen is resting on the matrix.

Severity	Disaster	High	Medium	Minimal
Probability	Critical	Critical	High	Medium
Regularly	Critical	High	Medium	Medium
Probable	Critical	High	Medium	Low
Asional	High	Medium	Medium	
rely				
able				

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Self-assessment




Discussion




Closure

Complex STS Theory: Application

How do we apply complex socio-technical systems theory to outdoor programs?



RESILIENCE ENGINEERING



**CONSIDER
ALL RISK DOMAINS**




**CONSIDER ALL RISK
MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS**




**CONSIDER
STRATEGIC RISKS**



**SYSTEMS-INFORMED
STRATEGIC PLANNING**



RESILIENCE ENGINEERING



**CONSIDER
ALL RISK DOMAINS**




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
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
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STRATEGIC PLANNING

Resilience engineering: create the conditions to withstand unanticipated problems

How?


1. Extra Capacity
2. Redundancy
3. Integrated Safety Culture
4. Psychological Resilience

#1



RESILIENCE ENGINEERING

#2



CONSIDER
ALL RISK DOMAINS

#3



CONSIDER ALL RISK
MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS

#4



CONSIDER
STRATEGIC RISKS

#5



SYSTEMS-INFORMED
STRATEGIC PLANNING


Extra Capacity

- Backup staff available
- Backup equipment available
- Staff trained to operate at level higher than conditions normally require—e.g. Class IV paddler to lead Class III whitewater




Redundancy

- Multiple ways to identify emerging safety issues
- Multiple leaders per group
- Multiple leaders trained in first aid
- Participants trained in first aid, emergency response if leaders incapacitated
- Multiple emergency telecom devices
- Multiple emergency evac options



RESILIENCE ENGINEERING



CONSIDER ALL RISK DOMAINS



CONSIDER ALL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS



CONSIDER STRATEGIC RISKS




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Integrated Safety Culture

- Balancing rules-based safety with allowing staff to use their judgement


Psychological Resilience

- Recruiting, hiring, training and retaining staff who have positive attitude towards challenge





RESILIENCE ENGINEERING



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
CONSIDER ALL RISK
MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS



CONSIDER
STRATEGIC RISKS



SYSTEMS-INFORMED
STRATEGIC PLANNING



Examples:

- Just culture
- Comprehensive new activity/location/population planning
- Evaluate all domains in incident analysis, incident reviews, risk management reviews

Just Culture

When an error occurs:

- Don't automatically blame the person
- Look for the underlying systems that led to the error

Focus is on *what went wrong*, not *who caused the problem*

This empowers people to report incidents, and helps the organization resolve the underlying safety issues





RESILIENCE ENGINEERING



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MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS



CONSIDER
STRATEGIC RISKS



SYSTEMS-INFORMED
STRATEGIC PLANNING



Risk
Transfer



Incident
Management



Incident
Reporting



Incident
Reviews



Risk
Management
Committee



Medical
Screening



Risk
Management
Reviews



Media
Relations



Documentation




Accreditation



Seeing Systems

#1



RESILIENCE ENGINEERING

#2



CONSIDER
ALL RISK DOMAINS

#3



CONSIDER ALL RISK
MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS

#4




CONSIDER
STRATEGIC RISKS

#5



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Demographic, Market and Social Shifts



Geopolitical Conflict and Instability



Climate Crisis



Legal trends & precedents





RESILIENCE ENGINEERING



CONSIDER
ALL RISK DOMAINS



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MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS




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
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Pre-mortem




Complex STS Theory: Application

How do we apply complex socio-technical systems theory to outdoor programs?



RESILIENCE ENGINEERING



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


**SYSTEMS-INFORMED
STRATEGIC PLANNING**

Self-Assessment

Complete the self-assessment on paper or at viristar.com/ao-safety-science to evaluate the extent to which your program employs risk management models, theories and systems-informed design in its risk management infrastructure:

Uses current models of incident causation/prevention




Employs complex STS theory in safety system design



Identifies and manages specific risks in each risk domain



Employs all applicable Risk Management Instruments



Employs principles of resilience engineering




Addresses strategic risks





For More Information

Risk Management for Outdoor Programs: A Guide to Safety in Outdoor Education, Recreation and Adventure

Risk Management for Outdoor Programs
40 hour online training, held over 4 weeks
courses.viristar.com




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